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Informal Logic 
IHidden' or IMissing' Premises* 
JAMES GOUGH 
CHRISTOPHER TINDALE 
Introduction of the Problem 
The first step of analysis or evalua-
tion of a piece of argumentation is de-
ciding what is included in the argu-
ment: What are its boundaries? Before 
we even begin to worry whether an 
argument is good or bad, sound or un-
sound, we are concerned to decide what 
the actual argument is. It is here that 
the problem of 'missing components' 
first arises, and it is this stage, and this 
stage alone, that concerns us in this 
paper. 
Trudy Govier, in her paper, "What's 
Not There: Missing Premises as a 
Problem for a Theory of Argument", 
(read at the C.P.A. meetings in june, 
1982 in Ottawa) discusses various 
approaches to the problem and offers 
some suggestions as to the nature of 
the 'problem'. 
She dismisses the position repre-
sentative of deductivism, namely, 
"given any argument, ... add premises 
to it to the point where the original 
premises, conjoined with the added 
premises, deductively entail the con-
clusion" (p. 3, pp. 4-7) (because some 
arguments just do not seem appro-
priate for a deductive formalization-
we cannot look at every argument as an 
aspiring deduction), and she makes 
some valuable points about what should 
not be allowed, i.e., that the sorting 
out of another's argument in a way that 
seems plausible to the evaluator, thus 
changing the argument, be opposed 
(p. 10). Finally, Govier offers the fol-
lowing understanding of the problem: 
"to claim that an argument has missing 
premises is to claim that ... the argu-
ment is incomplete," but" ... we have 
no obviously applicable notion of exact-
ly what would have to be there in order 
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for the argument to be complete," 
and consequently, in the absence of a 
universally applicable notion of com-
plete argument, it appears that " ... 
the missing premise is a product of the 
reflective mind. Like Humean causes, 
it is thrust upon the external text by 
the active intellect of the critic." 
A number of questions arise: Is it 
actually the case that to claim an argu-
ment has missing premises is to claim 
that it is incomplete? Do we, in fact, 
have no obviously applicable notion 
of what is needed in any given argu-
ment? But more contentious is the 
assertion that a missing premise is a 
product of the reflective mind, for this 
implies that the missing premise is 
absent from the text under examina-
tion and needs to be inserted by the 
examiner .[1] It is here that we see the 
real problem of missing premises 
appearing. Namely, are missing pre-
mises material which is added to the 
text or extracted from it? We are con-
cerned by the notion of adding material 
to the text under examination and the 
obvious problems that result from such 
a procedure. [2] 
That such a problem is a real one (if 
indeed we are correct in identifying 
the problem of missing premises) 
seems commonly accepted by informal 
logicians. johnson and Blair, for exam-
ple, assert: "Detecting and formula-
ting missing premises is one of the 
essential skills in logic," but their defi-
nition of 'missing premise' _"a propo-
sition which, though unstated in the 
argument, nevertheless is needed to 
link a stated premise with a conclu-
sion"[3]-does not resolve the ques-
tion of whether the 'missing premises' 
are found internally (a product of the 
text), or supplied externally (a product 
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of the critic). Stephen N. Thomas re-
fers to I suppressed' premises, but 
seems somewhat ambiguous in what he 
has to say about them. He suggests 
that we I add' what is "indirectly con-
tained", and his criterion for doing 
so is: "because it seemed reasonable 
to assume that they were intended 
or believed by the author. Either they 
fit well with the rest of the author's 
general views as expressed in the dis-
course and adding them improved the 
argument, or else they were well-
known truth s, or both. 1/ [ 4] Cross ley 
and Wilson seem a bit more helpful 
in their brief discussion of 'hidden 
premises' especially their suggestion 
that that premise should be provided 
which "seems encouraged by the argu-
mentf/[S] (emphasis ours). Unfortu-
nately, they do not provide further 
elaboration of this interesting sugges-
tion, and more needs to be said.[6] 
The Notion of Hidden Premises 
By way of responding to the problem 
as we identify it, we will expand upon 
and elaborate on this comment made by 
Crossley and Wilson. It seems clear, 
as Govier has argued, that in informal 
logic we are not looking for the missing 
premise(s} which would render the 
argument deductively valid. Rather, 
we are seeking that which is in fact 
'hidden' in the text of the argument, 
and the best critical technique for dis-
covering it.[7] 
Some mention of assumptions is re-
quired here, since they are often iden-
tified with hidden premises. Obviously 
in any argument there are many points 
assumed by the author, some of which 
are quite trivial; the activity of arguing 
presupposes such a base of beliefs 
which are simply assumed. Assump-
tions, then, are the underlying beliefs 
that an author does not recognize as 
there or takes to be too obvious or com-
monplace to mention explicitly, and 
while it may be constructive to note 
the important assumptions when or-
ganizing the argument, we would want 
to keep them distinct from the actual 
premises (whether they be stated or 
hidden). Hence, we shy away from 
calling any hidden premise an assump-
tion because it is neither helpful nor 
always true: Often the hidden premise 
is simply an unstated point, integral 
to the argument, but not at all an 
assumption in the sense defined above. 
Perhaps it helps if we ask ourselves 
why we need missing premises in the 
first place. It is not so much that we 
recognize an argument as incomplete 
but that insofar as we do recognize 
the argument we understand part of 
it to be hidden within the meaning of 
the author's stated assertions. In pre-
ferring 'hidden' over 'missing' we point 
to a distinction which better clarifies 
the issue at hand. After all in what 
sense is the premise 'not there', which 
indeed is what 'missing' implies? 
Ideally, the premises needed for the 
formulation of the argument should be 
presented by the piece of argumenta-
tion itself. There could be a number of 
premises without any relation to the 
text for want of a real expectation 
which establishes their association. 
The hidden premise, however, has a 
natural relation to the text which an 
inserted premise does not have. And 
this relation is founded in our recog-
nition of the whole as an argument. 
Rather, we see the argument as a co-
herent whole. In extracting the hidden 
premise we are in fact searching for 
something that we already possess; 
we are just organizing the argument in 
such a way that makes what we do know 
explicit. (A situation that is perhaps 
similar to that in the Meno.) This in-
volves stepping back, as it were, in 
our minds and 'seeing' how the state-
ments relate as a cohesive piece of 
argumentation. Such a way of 'seeing' 
reveals how the pieces present relate 
to each other.[BJ 
Why do we need to make expl icit 
such hidden premises? Because they 
are an integral part of the argument as 
we discover it. They do not necessarily 
make the argument, although they 
could strengthen it. Since a claim with 
one reason for support could be enough 
to establish an argument, then further 
premises drawn out of the text serve 
only to expand upon that argument 
and do not create a different one. If it 
is a question of what these premises 
are, then our only source of information 
is the context of what is given. 
We must not overlook the fact that 
we are rarely dealing with simplified, 
structured material. "All men are 
mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal!! 
itself provides us with a hidden pre-
mise. But, outside of logic textbooks 
in the real world-we usually find our-
selves confronted with unstructured 
material which does not translate easi-
ly, or in some cases at all, into formal 
modes or argumentation. Take the 
following example: 
Abortion is not murder. The soul 
does not enter the body until the first 
breath is taken. Up to this point, 
the fetus is a biological entity only.[9] 
It is not difficult to recognize the 
argument here, but we need also to 
state a 'hidden' premise which is given 
in the material and appears as an 
integral part of the argument. 
C: Abortion is not murder. 
P1: The soul enters the body with the 
first breath. 
P2: Until such time the fetus is a 
biological entity. 
HP: Only ensouled entities can be 
murdured. 
The missing material is hidden behind 
the material that suggests it. The pos-
sibilities are immediately restricted 
such that any external alteration by 
the critic is unwarranted. It is the 
text itself which reveals what is "not 
there". To talk about completeness 
here obscures the issue. 
In dealing with the problem of hidden 
premises we are concerned with arri-
ving at the best version of what the 
writer intended which is not to say 
that we are necessarily aiming at the 
ideal of a "complete" argument. What 
do we mean here by " complete"? 
Presumably we are not talking about 
complete as "sound" in the deduct-
ivist sense but as "all there!!. Govier 
suggests (p. 1 above) that we have no 
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obviously applicable notion of what 
would have to be there in order for the 
argument to be complete. But this is 
in a sense to shift the focus and side 
with the thinking that material can be 
added. Any argument which we iden-
tify as an argument is a total structure. 
How can we recognize it as incomplete? 
We see that some parts are "hidden!! 
and we draw these out, then we have 
"all there is!!, and if one wants to call 
this complete then by all means do so. 
But this is the only idea of complete 
argument that we can have. To look 
further is to say that certain things 
need to be added, but, as Govier notes, 
where does one stop? The trick, per-
haps, is not to start but accept only 
what is there, If we had a concept which 
understood in advance that each argu-
ment consisted of ten premises, then 
we could easily see that, say, five 
were missing. But we don't have such 
a concept, we can't ever justify adding 
five premises, and, as we have sug-
gested, each argument prescribes 
its own boundaries, its own coherent 
structure, each determines for itself 
what is involved in its completeness. 
In a sense, talk of completeness here 
leads us astray. To claim that an argu-
ment has missing premises is not ne-
cessarily to claim that it is incomplete. 
This helps vindicate the use of "hid-
den" which avoids any use of "com-
pleteness" . 
It must be admitted in all of this that 
we cannot avoid imparting a necessary 
act of judgment to the critic. Despite 
any insistence that only what is object-
ively given should be supplied, the fact 
remains that the ultimate decision to 
accept as sufficient a certain number of 
premises is a subjective act. In this 
regard dissatisfaction may arise. We 
are, after all, aiming at the develop-
ment of a critical faculty as opposed 
to a formal system. This still allows for 
the element of judgment that Govier 
suggests, which we cannot believe 
that informal logic will ever eliminate. 
Of course, it is here that the skill 
of good reasoning comes to promi-
nence. After all, we are dealing with 
inductive principles and the primary 
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role of the philosopher as reasoner. 
Any suggestions which we offer need 
not match the rigour of formal validity. 
We seek, then, an open-ended set of 
guidelines as opposed to a closed 
system of rules. 
Hidden Premises and the 
Principle of Charity 
As an answer to the fundamental 
question: Is there an argument in this 
piece of text or not?, which we asked 
at the beginning of this paper, Thomas, 
Scriven, Kahane and others have sug-
gested the use of an attitude-guide 
known as the Principle of Charity. 
It is generally characterized as an 
ethical principle of "fairness", an 
important part of an evaluator's de-
fensive strategy and a good epistemic 
device for discovering the "truth". 
It enjoins the evaluator of a piece of 
text to: (1) assume initially that the 
writer is "sensible" and not a complete 
idiot, whose views are capable of 
wholesale dismissal,[10} (2) avoid 
"nit-picking" or attacking (setting up?) 
a straw man of the writer's intended 
argument or position, and (3) refrain 
from irrelevant appeals (e.g. 'it is ob-
vious he doesn't have a good command 
of English grammar, so why should I 
-the evaluator-assume there is an 
argument buried somewhere within 
his text?'). Thomas uses it as a way of 
guiding our judgment of whether or 
not a piece of text contains an argu-
ment. Entreating the student to avoid 
an initially cynical approach to the 
material, he says: 
(I)f it is unclear whether an author is 
giving any reasons at all, then do not 
attribute an argument if the argument 
you should attribute is no good .... For 
our aim in studying logic is not so much 
to refute other people's arguments 
as it is to find the truth through rea-
soning.[11] 
Objections to the use of the principle 
centre on the notion that it tells the 
evaluator to add a number of 'missing' 
but needed premises until we have pro-
duced the 'best possible' argument. 
The problem, of course, is that this 
advice leaves us pondering: (1) whether 
or not the evaluator has in fact pro-
duced a new argument to support the 
conclusion and (2) how many premises 
we would need to add in order to pro-
duce the 'best possible' argument out 
of the text given. On this reading of 
the principle, we are left with what 
appears to be a nearly impossible task. 
But it is precisely "this" reading of 
the principle and what it enjoins us to 
do that is at fault here. On our reading, 
however, premises are extracted from 
and not injected into or added onto the 
text to make an argument. Hidden 
premises unlike missing premises are 
already there, not added to what is 
there to make something out of what 
is there. Advice telling us to give a 
piece of text a "fair" reading is not 
the same as advice telling us to cons-
truct the best possible argument out 
of the limited material given in the 
text. 
If a critic objects to this reading with 
the rejoinder: "But, I see no sentence 
in the text corresponding to the hidden 
premise you list in your standardiza-
tion of the argument," then our res-
ponse must be: "Look more carefully 
at what the argument is and what hid-
den premises are implied," not "Try 
to view the material more sympathetic-
ally, so that you produce a better argu-
ment." The former advice is not ambi-
guous, for at the stage of argument 
derivation, we act as archeologists 
unearthing an argument not architects 
or engineers actually designing or 
producing one. We are not being ad-
vised to: 'make a silk purse out of a 
sow's ear' but rather to accurately draw 
the boundaries of the argument pre-
sented. For Scriven, this could involve a 
rewriting of some sentences to remove 
vagueness and make the passage more 
precise. For Quine, it could involve 
construing a translation in such a way 
as to make the message conveyed less 
absurd or siIIY.[12] 
If, after having given the writer the 
best possible/most plausible reading 
of his/her argument, which in many 
cases may include the extraction of 
hidden premises, it turns out on sub-
sequent analysis that the argument 
thus derived is bad, then we have pro-
duced the strongest possible interpre-
tation of the most plausible argument 
the writer could produce. This attitude 
obviously generates a good defensive 
strategy for the subsequent evaluation I 
since it best protects the evaluation 
from strong and possibly devastating 
counter-attacks. Ceterus paribus, we 
would hope that others appraising our 
arguments and evaluations would 
follow the same attitude-guiding 
principle in a way universalizing it 
for both writer and critic. 
It is our belief that this proposal 
for the interpretation and use of the 
Principle of Charity alleviates some 
problems associated with it and accords 
with the derivation of hidden premises. 
This is in line with the use Scriven in-
tended for the principle, since: "It 
tells you that you want to interpret 
the argument's meaning in whatever 
way makes the most sense and force 
of it, because otherwise, it can easily 
be reformulated slightly in order to 
overcome your objections."[13] 
Some Working Examples 
Earlier we stated that we should not 
stipulate formal rules. We do, however, 
need to suggest certain guidelines 
whenever they are required. For exam-
ple, in response to the query, "how 
many missing premises can we al-
low?", we would propose, as many as 
are needed to begin an adequate cri-
tique as long as you do not begin ex~ 
panding upon the text by inserting 
fresh material. This is to say that we 
can extract as much as we feel is there, 
but that as soon as we begin adding 
"necessary" material we are on 
tenuous grounds and run the risk of 
committing a straw man. 
In the abortion example cited earlier 
the premise we extract ("only ensouled 
entities can be murdered") is perfectly 
warranted and an integral part of the 
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argument. A group of beginning logic 
students unfamiliar with such exercises 
changed the argument in various ways 
by adding material before they recog-
nized what was given in the text.[14] 
We feel that our suggestion avoids this 
danger. 
In the following example the argu-
ment incorporates an analogy drawn 
from a hidden implication. 
A man who drives his car into the 
rear of another car is not guilty 
of careless driving if his brakes 
failed. Similarly, if a man kills 
another man he is not found 
guilty of murder if his mind failed 
to perceive reality due to mental 
illness. 
Mental instability is not suffi-
cient to establish insanity, as Mr. 
C. contends. Our judicial system 
justly requires that a person must 
have rationally formed the inten-
tion to ki II another person to be 
considered a murderer. Insanity 
is, therefore, an appropriate de-
fence for murder.[15] 
Here the conclusion: "Insanity is, 
therefore, an appropriate defence for 
murder" is supported by a number of 
premises including the following 
hidden assertion of a comparision. 
HP - the two situations are compa-
rabie, so if you accept the 
principle in the case of the 
driver/brakes, you should also 
accept it in the case of the 
murder/mental illness. 
This assertion is not "missing" but 
can actually be found in the argument. 
One of the considerations in assessing 
the strength of this argument will be 
the adequacy/legitimacy of this ana-
logy. 
Analogy when used as an argument 
form is one which we must recognize 
to depend upon a hidden element in 
order for the reasoning to be effective. 
This hidden element is embodied in 
the argument; it suggests that since 
characterictic 'x' is known to be a pro-
perty of A, and B is analogous to A, 
then 8 will have characteristic "x". 
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The previous example seems not so 
much to be an argument from analogy 
using this criterion, as an argument 
employing analogy. This analogy helps 
to support the latter premise which 
defines "murderer" as someone who 
has rationally formed the intention 
to ki II another person. Th i sin turn 
leads to the conclusion. 
In the following example from Rus-
sell we have a direct argument from 
analogy. 
If, therefore, we are to believe that a per-
son survives death, we must believe 
that the memories and habits which 
constitute the person will continue to 
be exhibited in a new set of occurrences. 
No one can prove that this will not 
happen. But it is easy to see that it is 
very unlikely. Our memories and habits 
are bound up with the structure of the 
brain, in much the same way in which 
a river is connected with the riverbed. 
The water in the river is always chan-
ging, but it keeps to the same course 
because previous rains have worn a 
channel. In like manner, previous events 
have worn a channel in the brain, and 
our thoughts flow along this channel. 
This is the cause of memory and mental 
habits. But the brain, as a structure, 
is dissolved at death, and memory 
therefore may be expected to be also 
dissolved. There is no more reason to 
think otherwise than to expect a river 
to persist in its old course after an earth-
quake has raised a mountain where a 
valley used to be.[161 
It is thought that since the relationship 
between the river and the riverbed is 
destroyed after an earthquake, and 
since the river/riverbed is analogous 
to the memory/brain, then the relation-
ship between the memory and the brain 
wi II be destroyed after the death of the 
brain.[17] In fact, the stated conclusion 
is' "memory therefore may be expected 
to be dissolved." We don't have room 
to layout the structure of this argu-
ment, but it can be seen that we have 
all that is necessary to begin analysis 
providing that we understand Russell 
to be employing a clear analogy. We 
are not justified in adding anything 
which would strengthen the argument 
such as, "Earthquakes always destroy 
the river and never just redirect it." 
This is because (1) this is not strictly 
warranted by the context, and (2) it 
means that we have already made a 
judgment about the argument (i.e. 
begun analysis), and we have stated 
that this stage precedes the assess-
ment of the argument's strength. (This 
is an important consideration which we 
have not examined fully; in what sense 
do we, perhaps tacitly, begin our anal-
ysis as we extract the argument?) 
We hope to have clarified in this dis-
cussion what exactly is involved in 
'missing' or 'hidden' premises, and to 
have resolved an ambiguity concerning 
them. Namely, whether the issue in-
volved adding or extracting such ele-
ments. Clearly we have argued for the 
latter. An argument, in so far as it is 
so recognized, prescribes its own 
boundaries, and one of the first steps 
of argument analysis involves dis-
covering those boundaries. An under-
standing of the overall coherence of the 
argument will reveal the relationships 
that exist between its parts, a revela-
tion which necessarily spotlights any 
hidden premises. This is the only no-
tion we can have of what is appl icable 
to any given argument. In the final 
analysis, all will rest upon the well-
developed judgment and skills of the 
critical thinker. But as more guidelines 
are introduced into the discipline the 
procedures followed will become less 
susceptible to arbitrariness. When the 
argument has been fully extracted J 
then the more arduous task of deciding 
whether it is good or bad can begin. 
Notes 
* In making small revisions to this pa-
per we have benefited from the com-
ments, both written and verbal, of the 
following: J aakko Hintikka, Robert 
Ennis, and especially Trudy Govier. 
[1] There is the alternative interpreta-
tion that the missing premise is 
discovered to be in the text 
through the reflection of the ex-
aminer. If this is Govier's intention 
then we are in full agreement and 
are glad only to emphasize the 
point. However, indications in her 
paper suggest otherwi se, i.e. she 
is concerned on page 5 with the 
relationship of added to existing 
material. 
[2] In looking at what the argument is 
we delay to a later stage of evalua-
tion any talk of what the argument 
would have to be before one could 
be convinced by it, before we could 
consider it a 'good' argument. 
Adding premises in the way that, 
say, Hitchcock suggests (Critical 
Thinking: A Guide to Evaluating 
Information. Methuen, 1983), 
appears to have some pedagogic 
value in that it teaches students 
what would be needed to construct 
a good argument in a particular 
case. Furthermore, it helps one 
to assess an argument's claim 
per se. In which case material can 
be added such that it is no longer 
x's argument, but a strengthened 
argument in support of x's claim. 
Our discussion does not pre-
cI ude such procedures, it on Iy 
precedes it, and we make these 
remarks only to note the possibility 
of confusing the preparation for 
evaluation of an argument with the 
evaluation itself. 
[3] R.H. Johnson and J .A. Blair, 
Logical Self-Defense (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hili Ryerson, 1977) pp. 
43-44. The Second edition (1983) 
does not resolve the problem noted 
here. 
( 4] Stephen N. Thomas, Practical 
Reasoning in Natural Language 
2nd ed., (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1981)p. 171. 
[5] David J. Crossley and Peter A. 
Wilson, How to Argue: Introduc-
tion to Logical Thinking (New 
York: Random House, 1979) 
p.107. 
[6] See also, Thomas Schwartz, 
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The Art of Logical Thinking (New 
York: Random House, 1980) 
pp.8-9. 
[7] As noted earlier, Govier rejects 
the deductivist approach, since 
premises could be added to make 
any argument deductively valid. 
Besides, our discussion does not 
have the goal of deductive validity 
in mind. We are concerned to 
uncover the argument that is there 
to begin with. It may sometimes 
happen that the argument which is 
revealed will be seen to be de-
ductively valid (clearly such things 
exist), but what we always seek in 
uncovering a hidden element is 
that which brings the argument 
together, that which relates the 
parts in a coherent whole. 
[8] With regard to this we are in-
debted to the insights of Prof. 
J aakko Hintikka. His example 
of Sherlock Holmes and the case 
of Silver Blaze would refer you to 
J aakko and Merrill Hintikka's 
"Sherlock Holmes confronts 
Modern Logic: Towards a theory 
of information-seeking through 
questioning," in E.M. Barth & 
J.L. Martens (eds.): Argumenta-
tion: Approaches to Theory Forma-
tion, 1982), sheds light onto the 
kind of procedure we are attempt-
ing to explain here. The horse, 
Silver Blaze, is missing, there is 
a dead man apparently murdered, 
and, thus, an unknown murderer. 
These facts confront the pol ice 
inspector who strives to under-
stand the relations between the 
three principals. Sherlock Holmes 
confronts the same scenario, but 
rather than looking for more facts, 
he uses the knowledge that he 
already possesses in asking why 
the dog which was present in the 
stables did not bark during the 
abduction of the horse and arouse 
the sleeping stable boys. Holmes 
concludes that the dog knew the 
abductor and this information 
leads to the solving of the crime. 
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The point is that as soon as Holmes 
focuses on this element which has 
always been there, then the scene 
takes on a different perspective in 
which everything falls into place. 
In one perception, that of the pol-
ice inspector, the dog is not really 
noticed, in the other perception 
the dog is recognized as an esssen-
tial element which when added 
makes the structure coherent 
and explanatory. Such is the role 
of the hidden premise in an argu-
ment. 
[9] J .c., Calgary, Today Magazine, 
Nov., 28, 1981. cf: J. Gough, 
A Sourcebook for Critical Think-
ing. (University of Waterloo, 
1983), ex. 77, p. 58. 
[10] Michael Scriven, Reasoning 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hili Book 
Company, 1976) p. 71. 
[11] Thomas, p. 16. 
[12] W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object 
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 
1960). p. 59n. 
[13) Scriven, p. 72. 
[14] For example: "the fetus does not 
exist until it breathes"; "the fetus 
does not have a soul", "the fetus 
is not a body" . 
[15] D.H.L., Burlington, Toronto Star, 
Feb. 15, 1982. A Sourcebook for 
Critical Thinking. ex. 9, p. 28. 
[16] It will be noted that Russell ap-
pears to want to suggest more than 
this, namely that the memory 
and mental habits are themselves 
destroyed, but the argument does 
not give sufficient support to this. 
The argument also has the prior 
fault of presenting dissimilar 
analogues. 
[17] Bertrand Russell, Why f Am Not 
A Christian. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1957) p. 89. 
Professor James Gough, c/o Depart-
ment of Philosophy, University of 
Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2l 3G1 
& Professor Christopher Tindale, De-
partment of Philosophy, Trent Univer-
sity, Peterborough, Ontario, K9l 7880 
